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Crowdsourcing Computer Security Attack Trees
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Abstract—This paper describes an open-source project called
RATCHET whose goal is to create software that can be used
by large groups of people to construct attack trees. The value
of an attack tree increases when the attack tree explores more
scenarios. Crowdsourcing an attack tree reduces the possibility
that some options might be overlooked. RATCHET has been
tested in classroom settings with positive results. This paper gives
an overview of RATCHET and describes some of the features that
we plan to add.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Attack tree analysis, as described by Brue Schneier in the
book Secrets and Lies [1], is the process of analyzing how
systems fail. Attack trees allow users to understand possible
threats against systems, visualize those threats and assign
various metrics to determine which threats are most likely
to occur. Fault tree analysis (FTA), similar to attack tree
analysis, has been used since the early 1960s to perform safety
and reliability evaluations in high-hazard industries including
originally the U.S. Air Force Ballistic Systems Division [2].
While attack tree analysis and fault tree analysis are used in
information technology and industrial engineering respectively,
the two methods have much in common.
Crowdsourcing is the process of harnessing the contri-
butions of a community of online users to supply services,
concepts, or content. Participants bring a rich background of
experience, perspective, and expertise to the problem.
Attack tree analysis is difficult to perform well as the
volume of detail that must be collected and collated to build a
useful tree is large and continually growing. This project com-
bines the ability of attack tree analysis to describe computer
security threats with the power of crowdsourcing to create
all-encompassing, open source, and community created and
maintained computer security attack trees.
There are several incentives to combine attack tree analysis
and crowdsourcing. These include visualization of security
threats, improved security, and quantification of security ef-
forts. Benefits to the computer security community can only be
realized if attack trees are sufficiently comprehensive to allow
them to address credible threats to a computer system. These
may include vulnerabilities for software and services, multi-
step attacks, social engineering, physical security, network
device security, etc. The number of attack vectors is too
large for a typical organization to understand all of them.
Crowdsourcing can address this problem by distributing the
effort required to build a complete tree. Collaboratively built
Fig. 1. Starting the Attack Tree
attack trees can be more complete and accurate, increasing
potential benefits to computing security.
Over the past year a team of faculty and students have im-
plemented a web-based system to allow an online community
of users to create attack trees viewable to the general public.
The online community has the ability to promote better ideas,
voting down the ones perceived as less valuable. RATCHET
can found at http://ratchet.csec.rit.edu/. RATCHET permits
people to visualize attack trees, share branches, and vote on
relevant information. RATCHET also provides a node by node
description.
RATCHET combines attack tree analysis with the power
of crowdsourcing to create an all encompassing, open source,
community created and maintained attack tree system. There
are a number of reasons to combine attack tree analysis and
crowdsourcing. These include visualization of security threats,
improved security, and quantification of security efforts. The
benefits to the computer security community afforded by attack
trees can only be realized to their fullest if the attack trees
created address the most relevant security threats to a system.
Given the number of possible attacks, attempting to generate
attack trees for all possible attacks is a task too large for
small to medium sized organizations. We believe that attack
trees created by crowdsourcing will be more complete and will
increase the likelihood that major benefits will be realized.
II. RELATED WORK
References [3]–[5] illustrate the advantages of using attack
tree analysis and fault tree analysis to model security threats.
Zhang et al. [6] show how to supplement fault tree analysis
models by adding privilege escalation metrics into the models.
Edge et al. [7] introduce the idea of expanding the attack
tree concept into a protection tree. They first create an attack
tree, calculate the appropriate metrics, and then they create a
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Fig. 2. The Second Attack Tree
Fig. 3. The Second Attack Tree With Cost Information
protection tree to help planners allocate resources to defend
against specific attacks. Roy et al. [10] take the idea of
protection trees a step further, proposing attack countermea-
sure trees where qualitative metrics, defense mechanisms, and
probabilistic analysis can be applied to nodes directly within
the tree. Bauer [8] discusses scenarios that can be turned into
attack trees.
Of special interest is an open-source project called Seamon-
ster [9]. Seamonster is a program designed to produce stand
alone attack trees. We will have more to say about Seamonster
later in this paper.
III. PROJECT GOALS
The goals for this project include: 1) Exploring attack tree
analysis and its use in quantifying computer security vulner-
abilities and efforts; 2) Creating an attack tree platform that
would be community created, maintained, and utilized (e.g.
crowdsourced); 3) Implementing features that will facilitate the
growth of a new online community focused on the creation of
computer security themed attack trees.
Our goal is to have people and organizations use
RATCHET to build attack trees specific to their infrastructure
and needs, and to share them with others. We expect that the
attack trees produced and shared in this manner will greatly
benefit the entire Information Technology (IT) community,
There currently exists no definitive information source or tool
for computer security engineers to use for guidance when
adding new devices or services to a network. With attack
tree analysis, determining points of failure or faults in current
network configurations when introducing new hosts or services
into an infrastructure would be more easily performed.
It is also possible that a cost and likelihood could be asso-
ciated with each attack or vulnerability. With this information,
an IT shop might apply a score to their computer security
efforts. Such a score could be used as a metric against which
to judge whether one is improving one’s defenses. Metrics
might be used to justify the cost of new devices or services,
or to validate the need for a configuration change. Utilizing an
attack tree can provide computer security professionals with
access to measurable data and help them evaluate the value of
adding a new security system or software patch.
IV. ORIGINAL VISION
A basic attack tree would be focused around a central
root node or objective. Such an objective might be to obtain
a users password. Branching off of a root node, one could
create multiple methods to obtain customer data. Fig. 1 shows
an example of how one might start an attack tree. The next
step might explore what methods one would use to search
for a written copy of the password, bribe the user for his or
her password, or utlize a keylogger to steal the password. At
this stage, a new community of researchers, IT professionals,
pentesters, or security minded individuals become a vital part
of the process. For example, one individual might know how
to burglarize an office, but not how to exploit a system and
install a keylogger. Working together, a group is more likely to
create a detailed attack tree using different methods of reaching
the same goal than would the individuals working alone. An
example is shown in Fig. 2.
By using attack trees, organizations can determine where
to focus their efforts in order to minimize potential threats.
Attack trees that include associated costs, such as the attack
tree in Fig. 3, are extremely useful. The attack tree in Fig.
3 can help determine which attacks might be preferred by an
attacker who would carry out a low-cost attack.
Price-points may be one method to analyze the value of a
given problem, but the cost between organizations might vary
based on any number of unrelated factors. Some organizations
are less cost-conscious than others. This realization led to a
concept that information might need to be assigned different
levels of visibility with some of it being global and other
items visible only to a particular user. Different attack methods
might be displayed with orientation attributes related to differ-
ent participants-user-oriented vs server-oriented for example.
Some attributes that might be of use in analysing cyber attacks
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Fig. 4. A More Elaborate Attack Tree
are presented in Table 1. A more elaborate attack tree is shown
in Fig. 4.
V. RATCHET
RATCHET is a prototype of a system that can leverage
crowdsourcing for the development of attack trees. Web appli-
cations provide a very convenient way to reach a lot of people.
If properly designed they require only access to a browser
which most computer users have. Fig. 5 shows the home page
of RATCHET.
The researchers and students involved in this project all
collaborated in gathering ideas for what the system should
accomplish, how it might be used and what issues it might
face. The application was designed for a collaborative audience
of users who would have sufficient knowledge and the ability
to help the system grow. The system can handle both simple
attack trees, e.g., a password attack, and complex attack trees,
e.g., attacking an operating system.
RATCHET has the ability to allow users to build a new tree,
node by node. Every node in the tree has an area for comments
and the capability of allowing users to vote in favor or against
it. Any node of any tree can be duplicated and attached to
any other node either within the same tree or in completely
Fig. 5. RATCHET Homepage
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TABLE I. EXAMPLE ATTRIBUTES FOR ATTACK TREE ANALYSIS
Attribute Scale
Cost Dollars
Difficulty Easy vs Challenging
Physical Presence Required Intrusive vs Non-Intrusive
Probability Possible vs Impossible
Special Equipment
(Resources) Required Availability & Traceability
Risk of Detection Evidence Left Behind or
Stealthiness
Skill Level Required Novice or Expert
different trees. Each attack tree is displayed visually using
Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG - an HTML5 technology that
natively allows for dynamically drawing within a web page
[11]). The users have the ability to zoom, pan or select any
of the created nodes, view the comments and add their own
ideas, vote on its relevance, or add a new child node of their
own.
We hope to make many improvements to RATCHET based
off feedback we have received thus far. Some suggestions we
have been thinking about include the ability to work offline,
limiting specific trees or nodes to a subset of logged in users
and the addition of analysis tools. It would also be good
for RATCHET to allow batch uploading of entire trees. This
might be done by supplying the user with a JSON (JavaScript
Object Notation) format and once the correctly formatted file
is uploaded, the system would parse the file and install the
tree.
VI. CLASSROOM FEEDBACK
During the Spring semester of 2014, Professors Stackpole
and Johnson taught a class titled Penetration Testing Method-
ologies where they hosted an exercise of the RATCHET sys-
tem. The goal of this class is to provide students with a realistic
Fig. 6. A Simple Attack Tree in RATCHET
experience with tools, techniques, and goals that face a typical
penetration tester or ethical hacker. Students are introduced to
the offensive side with items such as Open Source Intelligence
(OSINT), scanning, penetration testing framework and col-
laboration tools, stepping stones, and password cracking. On
the defensive side, items such as firewalls, Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS), Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), antivirus,
software updates, and the like are introduced.
Attack trees were presented as a tool for organizing a
penetration testing exercise. The concept of attack trees was
raised as the topic for an initial discussion with students. A
short training session on how to use RATCHET was presented.
Students were broken into four teams with six students per
team. Each team was instructed to address two goals: one
goal specified the target as an operating system, and the
other addressed the exploitation of an application. Each team
was instructed to perform a pre-event survey capturing their
preconceived notions and opinions on the use and value of
attack trees. The class was given a half hour introduction and
RATCHET system and its use. Each team was to conceptualize
an attack tree to reach their stated goals and to input their
attack tree elements into the RATCHET system.
Each team was tasked with reviewing the attack trees
created by two other teams, adding content where appropriate,
and reviewing the work submitted by their peer teams. The
student teams were tasked with using their Attack Trees in
performing an attack on a specific target in the Security
Lab. Finally the students were asked to provide feedback on
the experience of designing their own tree specific to the
RATCHET implementation through another survey instrument.
This exercise spanned approximately 3 weeks of the course.
From this exercise, several changes were made to the
RATCHET system mainly revolving around the interface de-
sign. The ability to change the focus of the tree and how to
indicate the node on the screen that commands or instructions
apply to was enhanced. It was noticed that students did not
immediately build or create the attack tree in RATCHET, they
built it first on a whiteboard then transposed it to RATCHET.
The feedback from students indicates that “In an unfamiliar
environment that which is familiar is attractive.”
Several issue arose from this exercise that were addressed
such as trouble with creating trees, adding new nodes, and
voting. While these issues did not stop the exercise they did
limit the amount of work that the students could accomplish.
As such the exercise was helpful for the developers and
enlightening for the students, but the results were of mixed
value and will not be included in this paper. Professors Johnson
and Stackpole plan to use this exercise in future classes.
In Fall 2014, Professor Markowsky taught a similar course
in cybersecurity at the University of Maine that included attack
trees as one of the topics studied. Students were encouraged
to draw attack trees manually, to use Seamonster [9] and to
use RATCHET. Informal feedback was solicited. As might be
expected, the manual approach was the easiest approach to
start with. It was clear that there were advantages to generating
attack trees on the computer since they generally looked better
and were easier to share. Seamonster was easy to use, but
did support crowdsourcing. Some people thought RATCHET
was more complicated to use than Seamonster, but just about
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everyone agreed that RATCHET produced the best looking
trees. Many students did not like the fact that they were unable
to delete nodes once they were created.
In the original design of RATCHET it was decided that
users could not delete nodes and that voting would be the
way nodes were promoted or demoted. We did not want some
user to just delete a tree that many other people had worked
on. It was clear that in creating attack trees there would be
occasional false steps that users wanted to remove from the
tree and they became frustrated by not being able to do so. We
plan to explore ways to enable users to delete nodes in limited
situations This might take the form of enabling deletion just
of nodes created by the user within a single editing session or
allowing users to delete nodes that they created but have not
been used by anyone working on the attack tree.
VII. FUTUREWORK
We have discussed some of the improvements we hope
to implement in RATCHET. In addition to the items already
mentioned, there are some other tasks that we would like
to complete. First, we would like to construct a library of
commonly needed sub-trees that could be copied into a tree un-
der construction to speed up development. Second, we would
like to augment the current attribute feature to handle richer
structured characteristics such as arrays, tables, or documents.
Third, we would like to augment the voting feature to allow
voting on the attributes individually.
It addition, we would like to add functions to RATCHET
that can perform various analyses of attack trees such as critical
path or least cost analysis. Finally, we hope to develop an ap-
plication program interface (API) to support the development
of external tools to utilize RATCHET.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Compared to other well established field of study such as
engineering and chemistry, computing security is still in its
infancy. As in the beginning of those other fields, methods,
language, and measurements had to be discovered, developed,
and generally accepted. The ability to record, exchange, and
compare the security state of an environment or situation is
necessary in order for the field to progress beyond an art. We
believe that attack trees can be used to document, describe,
and measure complex, multivariable, and situationally sensitive
environments such as the ones found in computing security.
We hope that the impact of attack tree software on the
field on computing security will be similar to the impact
of electronic spreadsheet programs such as Lotus 1-2-3 or
VisiCalc [12]. Just as spreadsheets permit business people
to easily do “What if?” scenarios, attack trees can provide
cybersecurity people the opportunity to experiment with “What
if?” scenarios. Examples of the sort of questions people
could ask are: “What if I replaced one firewall product with
another?”, “What if the Exchange mail server is replaced by the
Exim mail server?”, “What if remote management is enabled
in a particular networking device?”. In general, these and other
scenarios could be explored quickly and cheaply.
The research and development efforts so far have demon-
strated that attack trees can be constructed through the work of
a community. The ability of attack trees to record and commu-
nicate the attack surface of an operating system, service, and
situation has been demonstrated. It has also been demonstrated
that attack trees can be shared and assembled to build large
and complete attack trees. We look forward to continuing the
development of RATCHET and we welcome feedback from
the IT community.
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